NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 23 | Number 4

Article 6

6-1-1945

Book Reviews
North Carolina Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
North Carolina Law Review, Book Reviews, 23 N.C. L. Rev. 388 (1945).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol23/iss4/6

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.

[Vol. 23

BOOK REVIEWS
Limits of Jurisprudence Defined. By Jeremy Bentham.
Columbia University Press. 1944. Pp. 358. $4.50.

New York:

Jeremy Bentham, 1748-1832, is included in the Continental Legal
History Series as one of the twenty-six great jurists of the world; and
his INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION,
is in Adler's list of the one hundred books, along with Aristotle, Spinoza
and Newton, which have influenced western civilization. The publication then in 1945 of the LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED, written
by Bentham in 1782, should be of interest to the antiquarian as well as
to the scholar, and in either aspect command more than passing notice.
The span of Bentham's life covered the break between the medieval
and modem world, during which the two decisive political and social
events of our time, viz.: the American and French Revolutions, took
place. Bentham did not give birth to the ideas which caused or precipitated these events, but he avowedly employed in the field of jurisprudence the same methods which had producd the decisive results in the
other two fields. Bacon's induction had furnished the process for the
overthrow of medieval scholasticism, not only in physical sciences, but
in other areas as well. Locke in his ESSAY ON THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, after subjecting the brain to the inductive test, banished the
theory of Innate Ideas, thus establishing the principle of equality at
birth, and thereby furnishing Rousseau and Jefferson with the basis for
their principles of the American and French Revolutions. Bentham
proposed to employ Bacon's logic, and follow in the field of jurisprudence, Locke's example in the realm of psychology.
Bentham, while a student at Oxford, heard Blackstone deliver the
lectures, known to subsequent generations, as the COMMENTARIES ON
THE COMMON LAW, where it was and is, asserted that the "common
law is the perfection of human reason." Bentham dissented then from
that thesis, and later published a Comment on the Commentaries wherein
he criticised Blackstone's conclusions and foreshadowed his own later
position; that if the common law is the perfection of human reason it
is an unsound premise, as authority and not reason, is basis for law.
This antipathy to the common law manifested by Bentham as a student,
became, after he was called to the bar, and witnessed its application, of
such a consuming conviction that he declined to practice it, and chose
rather to spend his life, in formulating a scientific system of law based
upon the human will, to be offered as a substitute, for the common or
customary law, based upon reason and experience.
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At the very outset of his undertaking, Bentham encountered, he
asserts, the fact that while Aristotle had formulated a logic of the
understanding, and all subsequent logicians had followed in his tracks,
no one had ever attempted .to formulate a logic of the will.' That task,
Bentham then laid upon himself, as the indispensable preliminary to further progress. In view of the studies made of human faculties since Bentham's day, it is difficult for us to appreciate his effort and achievement
in that connection unless we can visualize ourselves as looking back,
through a clearing in the forest, hacked out by the pioneer.
In the process of formulating his logic, Bentham -subjected the will
to the scientific scrutiny of the five senses, as Locke had the human
understanding, with the result, that as the latter had excluded the supernatural element from the mind, so Bentham excluded it from the will.
The product of his labors were embodied in the INTODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLE OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, above referred to, though the
word morals in the title, is not used in the ethical sense, but in relation
to the will as controlling conduct. The logic of the will, as formulated
by Bentham is simple in substance, but complicated in analysis and expression. He coined for that purpose a nomenclature. Man, he asserts,
is born subject to two sovereigns, viz.: pain and pleasure, and his will
is thereafter controlled by reactions and responses to one or the other
of these emotions. To avoid pain and experience pleasure is the individual objective, and the greatest pleasure for the greatest number is the
collective goal. Every act then is to be tested by its utility in furnishing
a margin of pleasure over pain. The individual will, and the general
will, which find expression only in law, thus motivated, control and
direct all individual and collective acts. The fact that the decrees of
individual will, though dominated by absolute laws, do not, for obvious
reasons, need to be formulated and printed, does not apply, for equally
obvious reasons, to decrees of the sovereign will. Those decrees which
control all acts, except those of the purely personal and private character, must be expressed in the written law, and the formulation of
such decrees is the science of legislation. Thus emerges the second
phase of Bentham's task, as indicated in the title, viz.: That of legislation, the only possible means of expressing the general will into law.
As part one of the treatise, written in 1780, deals with morals or
the will, so part two, now under review, treats of legislation, and Bentham's method, in the LIMITS

OF JURISPRUDENcE DEFINED,

with respect

to legislation, is analysis and synthesis. He resolved law into eight
several parts, each a subject of a chapter, and then synthesizes the parts
into a complete law. Each part falls into place with the same logical
precision as the parts of speech into a correctly diagrammed sentence.
The words used to designate the parts, namely: source; subject; ob-
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ject; extent; aspects; force; science; and appendages, suggest the functions of each; though "source" has both a legal and political aspect, for
it may reside in or be expressed by one or an assemblage of persons,
e.g., a czar or a parliament, and it would be fallacious to suggest that
anything less, without the sanction of the general will could by custom
or usage make a valid law. The subject of law is persons, and acts
alone is its object. Law is a command to do or not to do, and creates
rights and obligations enforced through pleasure and pain. There is no
distinction between civil, penal, legal or equitable laws, except in the
degree of penalty for infractions.
Bentham's purpose was an authoritarian codification of all law
which he sought to substitute for, rather than to reform, the common
law; but as the common law is a process of legal freedom, and in the
words of Judge Pearson, "works itself pure," it met Bentham's attack
by correcting many of the imperfections he pointed out, and for the
next century became stronger rather than weaker thereby.
The justification for the publication of Bentham's work in regard to
legislation now, is to me, the growing, although disturbing, tendency
toward codification, by which life is now regimented, rather than in the
suggestion of a recent discovery. Bentham had the most brilliant disciples to edit or publicize his works. To mention Lord Brougham, the
chancellor, John Stuart Mill, Etienne Dumont, and Sir Samuel Romilly
will suffice; but among others equally famous, was John Austin, who
lectured at Queen's College, London, on jurisprudence, had access to
Bentham's manuscripts deposited there, and who in 1851 published
THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, which dealt largely
with the same material contained in Bentham's LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED. The similarity in title and content is thus sufficient to
negative the idea of hidden treasure.
Bentham became at once upon the publication of Part I of his treatise, famous throughout the Civil Law Code countries of Europe and the
Americas, though he never became popular in the common law areas.
Now, however, his ideas of codification in the realm of international law,
a word he coined, may find their greatest usefulness when so many
publicists are of the opinion that international order can only securely
rest on a codified international law sanctioned by the sovereign will of
the United Nations.

R. 0.
Member of the Durham, North Carolina, Bar,
Durham, North Carolina.

EVERETT.
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Selection and Tenure of judges.
By Evan Haynes. The Judicial
Administration Series. Published under the auspices of The National Conference of Judicial Councils. 1944. Pp. xix, 303.
As Mark Twain observed concerning the weather, there has been a
great deal of talking-and writing-about it, but very little done about
it. Few subjects are more calculated to lubricate the vocal chords of
the brethren of the bar when they gather professionally-and few more
likely to be left relatively free of actual reform-than the selection and
tenure of judges. It has become earmarked as one of those "safe" subjects on which even the most conservative lawyer can offer publicly
radical proposals with confidence that his reputation for soundness will
not be injured-and that nothing will be done about the suggestions.
The various plans now in use for the selection of judges appear, like
Topsy, to have "just growed" and a logical appraisal of almost any of
them reflect glaring weaknesses calling for improvement. Dean Pound's
introduction pithily stresses such fundamentals as the necessity for individual responsibility in the appointing power, adequate information
concerning the capacities of the candidates, and a full appreciation of
the function and importance of the judge. In pointing out that length
of service alone can often raise the social value of a judge, he observes
that our Chief Justice Ruffin, one of the "twelve outstanding jfidges in
American judicial history," as did each of the other eleven, served the
judiciary for at least a quarter century.
Professor Haynes has devoted fully a third of the book to analyses
and tables reflecting in detail such matters as the manner of selection
and tenure of the judges in each state together with the provisions for
their retirement; these features make the book an excellent sourcebook
in a field heretofore lacking such a comprehensive survey The text has
a rather unexpected, but justifiable, arrangement. The survey of the
American scene shows the predominance of the elective system (more
than two-thirds of the states) with noticeable restraints upon legislative
control, such as the prohibition of direct reduction of salaries during
terms. This rise of the American movement toward popular control
(with short terms) during our ante-belium period is presented, with
valuable digests of the early constitutional provisions in each state, as
a part of the world movement toward popular control of government.
The study of the English Stuart judges is little more than an exhibit
on the evils of insecure tenure, but the discussion of the modern English judiciary is more informative, leaving one with the conviction that
a cumbersome and obsolete system has nevertheless been able to retain
popular respect and to produce judges of a high order. The discussion
of foreign judicial systems drives home with emphasis the fact that
popularly elected, short-term judges are peculiarly American; not even
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the democratic Scandinavian countries have accepted them. Canada
patterhed her system closely after England and our South American
neighbors appear to have been influenced by our Federal, rather than
our state, plan. The pre-war German (copied by the Japanese) and
Italian judicial organizations were patterned after the French model
under which high judicial position is attained only after years of apprenticeship, slow promotion, and modest salaries in a genuine career profession, the judiciary. A noticeable omission is comment upon the
Russian courts where democratic' influences have given emphasis to
election (as opposed to appointment), to short terms, and to the use
of laymen as judges, the latter a Scandinavian idea.
The judicial retirement statutes for each state are summarized. Since
security of tenure is perhaps the most important single factor in the
mechanics of judicial organization, it is important that liberal retirement
provisions tend to offset the lowered earnings which the ablest lawyers
must normally accept in leaving the practice for the bench; such provisions are also important in persuading able young judges, with their
socially valuable judicial experience, to forego the financial attractions
of returning to the practice. Most important of all, perhaps, is the
value of retirement plans to rid the bench of elderly judges who have
passed the period of their greatest usefulness, yet find their standard
of living and lack of wealth compel them to cling to their only sure
means of livelihood. Without retirement stipends, common decency
-prevents the enforced retirement of such judges with the result that
younger men must carry the load or the efficiency of the bench suffers
sharply by the actual retirement of judges on the bench at full pay.
Such retirement expenditures are not gratuities, but are sound, nominal
expenditures in the interest of efficient judicial administration.
The most interesting chapter is an essay entitled "Are Elected
judges With Short Terms More Liberal than Appointed Judges With
Secure Tenure?" Based on a critical examination of cases in such fields
as labor, landlord-tenant, debtor-creditor, lien, employment agency, and
mortgage moratorium law, the author demonstrates that appointed
judges with secure tenures are far more liberal than elected, short-tenure
judges. This conclusion is all the more surprising in the face of the
fact that organized labor has often fought for the election of shortterm judges.
As a reference work not the least useful feature is the elaborate
bibliography (with valuable thumbnail abstracts of each) covering exhaustively the published material on the subject of the text. Out of
the welter of proposed plans it is significant that (1) appointment by
the governor or chief justice (2) from a panel-selected by a judicial
council, commission or other qualified body (3) with popular approval
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or disapproval shown at an election in which the judge runs without
personal opposition "on his record," is the general outline of the plan
which has received increasingly stronger approval in many sections of
the country. Any one of a number of such proposals would do much
to further insulate the judicial system from the horse-trading and campaigning of the common garden variety of politics, a need which is
almost universally recognized-at least in the abstract. Improvement
can be achieved. One is reminded of the incident of the argument Alice
had with Humpty-Dumpty. "The question is," said Alice, "whether
you can make words mean so many different things." To which
Humpty-Dumpty imperiously answered, "The question is which is to
be Master-that's all ......
DILLARD S. GARDNER.

Marshal-Librarian,
North Carolina Supreme Court.
Philadelphia Lawyer, An Autobiography. By George Wharton Pepper. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co. 1944. $3.75.
It is rumored, no doubt without justification, that an attorney arguing a case before an appellate court sometimes endeavors to persuade
the judges to read his brief. There is a similar impression that a reviewer, instead of using the space allotted to him as a personal sounding
board, sometimes seeks to interest the reader in the book. This is
decidedly one of those times.
Senator Pepper and his book cannot be summed up in a single
phrase. But if there is one word which can suggest the fundamental
obligation which any man owes to his own life it is the word "sportsmanship." Starting from this premise Senator Pepper considers among
other events, President Roosevelt's failure to listen to a speech by
Wendell Willkie pledging support as a "patriotic opposition."1 And
his comment is:
"The incident led me to re-enlist for the rest of my life in a struggle
which has evidently only just begun. The struggle, that is, to prevent
the permanent surrender to the Executive of powers which the American people would never delegat except in a great emergency and then
only for the period of its duration."
The book deliberately reveals much self-evaluation. "Ostensibly it
has been written for the pleasure of friends who urged me to record my
experiences. Actually, of course, the dominant motive has been selfgratification."'2 "Even as a small child my training must have given
1P. 265.
Introduction.
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me a rigorous sense of decorum." 3 Speaking of Hoover he says, "He,
in a big way, and I, in miniature, represent a sort of middle-of-the-road
'4
liberalism displeasing both to reactionaries and radicals."
A reviewer might write a review on the topic "Philadelphia as Seen
Through the Eyes of a Gentleman." In such event paragraphs like
the following would be quotable:
"To mention Walnut Street to an old Philadelphian is to awaken memories of a departed glory. On bright Sundays, after Church, there was
always an informal parade of fashion on the south side of this thoroughfare. Therethe City's Four-Hundred could be seen to great advantage.
They were the blended congregations of half a dozen mid-city Churches.
They made upon the onlooker an impression of urbanity, of social experience and of entire self-satisfaction. If during Church-time they
had confessed themselves miserable sinners, by the time they appeared
on parade their restoration to divine favor was seemingly complete.",,
A reviewer might select a more controversial subject such as "A
Middle of the Road Republican Disagrees with the New Deal." Among
many excellent illustrative paragraphs, the following seems in point:
"In the pre-Rooseveltian era when I arose to address the Supreme
Court on an issue between the federal government and a citizen I felt
myself in the presence of judges who were not conscious of being part
of the governmental machine. In that respect they were wholly different from the revenue official or the regulatory commission or the
executive agency from whose edict I was appealing. Today the atmosphere surrounding the Court is such that the citizeh's advocate is conscious of a courteous but definite predisposition on the part of the
Justices to find the Government in the right unless the facts make it
intellectually stultifying so to do; and what we lawyers, whether on or
off the bench, can do without consciously stultifying ourselves is indeed
'something!' In other words, the advocate who nowadays argues before
the Supreme Court is before just another federal agency-manned, indeed, by able and honest men but men whose conception of primary
duty is to keep the federal steamroller rolling."0
Other topics as is natural in the story of a rich and varied life crowd
for attention. "The Church" makes its impression upon the reader in
the interesting discussions of the significance of the Communion Service
and the author's work in local churches and at the Cathedral in Washington. His vacations lead one to Maine and at times to Europe. His
family, his office routine, his hobbies are among the more intimate
aspects of his interests.
The present reviewer was particularly impressed with the following
observations:
3

P. 24.

'P.
238.
5
P. 17.
SP. 282.
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"It seems to me that in all this welter of criticism and abuse there has
been pretty general failure to distinguish between two entirely different
sins of the lawyer. The professional ideal is fidelity to the Court, as
representing the public, and to the client for whom the attorney is
trustee.... Those who are indifferent to public interest are relatively
few and can readily be identified. Those seemingly incapable of grasping the conception of trusteeship are legion and they are the microbes,
working in secret, who threaten the life of the bar. . . . My guess is
that a majority of the whole number of young men who come to the
bar in our big cities think of the client as the merchant does of his customer. The two deal at arm's length and the young attorney proceeds
on the vicious
assumption that the client is quite able to take care of
7
himself."
The question as to the primary obligation of the lawyer has received
attention by various writers in the field of legal ethics. Sometimes it
is stated in language similar to these words: the lawyer's duty runs to
his client, the court, the profession and the community. The order does
not necessarily indicate the primary obligation. In a number of decided
cases the judges proceed from the concept of the lawyer as an officer
of the court, and thereby by implication, make this the primary obligation. If we are dealing with an excess of zeal by the lawyer on behalf
of his client it is certainly the duty of the court to check him. But the
above quotation suggests that the major problem is selfishness resulting
in a lack of zeal for the interests of the client. Assuming this to be
the case it may be that the proposition should be stated in language
somewhat like the following: The lawyer's duty runs to his client, the
court, the profession and the community. To the client he owes the
zeal of a trustee. Where his zeal toward his client exceeds the proprieties the court should check him as severely as may be necessary.
But there are two other obligations-to the profession, because a lawyer
has colleagues, and to the community because a man should be a good
neighbor. This is an example of the constructive and stimulating ideas
in the volume.
But the reader should not assume that the work has been written
without touching upon controversial issues. Nor is the author half-'
hearted in defense of his views. For example:
"Later still the utterances of President Franklin Roosevelt and some of
his cabinet about the Justices of the Supreme Court were perfect illustrations of indecent comment by one of the three branches of government upon another. Our federal game is a good game as long as it is
played according to the rules. As soon, however, as one of the players
begins to slug everything gets into a mess. There is then no referee
who' can send the slugger to the showers or award a heavy penalty
against his side. If the people could be made to understand such a
P. 342.
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situation they would -deal with a slugger summarily because American
public opinion is almost always sportsman like." s
Those of us who through the years have known and respected Senator Pepper find him again in this book. He is considerate of others,
interested in the public welfare, a good friend, a high minded Christian
gentleman. But he is also a man of courage, a lawyer of unusual ability,
a sturdy landmark in an era of shifting values. His friends are glad

he wrote the book.
JOHN

S.

BRADWAY.

Duke University,
Durham, North Carolina.
Crime and the Human Mind. By David Abrahamsen.
Columbia University Press. 1944. Pp. xii, 244.

New York:

This book is based on lectures given at the postgraduate courses of
the Psychiatric Institute of Columbia University; but its relevance to
practical problems in legal procedure will become evident from a rapid
summary, chapter by chapter. We will sacrifice perfect connectedness
of style to faithfulness to the text.
(Chap. I) The conceptions of crime that are revealed in a brief
historical sketch include the lex talionis, the Classical, neo-Classical, and
atavistic, leading up-thanks to Lombroso in large part-to the recognition that there are certain psychological traits which are frequently
found in criminals. A change of major importance in later times is
that from psychological explanations in terms of single traits or processes to those recognizing a plurality of interrelated factors. (II)
"Crime may... be considered a product of a person's tendencies and
the situation of the moment interacting with his mental resistance [inhibitions]. Letting C stand for crime, T for tendencies, S for the situaT+S
tion, and R for resistance.... C " (pp. 26-27).
We have
R
dealt too long with the so-called "bad environment," and have forgotten
to ask why and how such a man came to be in such surroundings (29).
(III) "On reviewing . . . investigations of heredity and environment,
one cannot feel satisfied that any of the groups have made decisive contributions in establishing the causes of crime" (50). (IV) The individual is in a socio-psycho-biological field and criminalistic patterns of
this field may arise from radically different sorts of factors-as is well
illustrated by cases. There are certain resemblances between the criminal and the child on the one hand and the neurotic on the other. (V)
"Abnormal psychological manifestations are exaggerations or distortions
8P. 88.
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of normal ones" (67). Examination of the offender should systematically include historical, medical, and psychological examination data,
and psychological test results, each examination section consisting of
sub-divisions. (VI) A suggested classification of offenders: Momentary-who include situational, accidental, and associational offenders;
and chronic-who include those with organic and functional disorders,
the momentary become chronic, the neurotic, and compulsory, the "neurotic characters," and those with faulty superegos. (VII) "As soon as
the youth reaches adulthood, his type of crime changes" (128) due in
part to the physiological changes. Statistics from American and British areas tend to reveal an increase of juvenile delinquency during the
present war. Child guidance clinics fail by being too far removed from
the juvenile's actual situation. (VIII) "The force which compels a
person to commit homicide is frustration in sexual, economic, or social
strivings"; and "it is questionable whether an apparently senseless and
purposeless murder isnot in reality incited by strong, although unconscious, motives" (154). "Some homicides are the result of inner conflict caused by some hate directed against a person in childhood calling
forth guilt feelings and self-punishment" (161).
(IX) Such tests of
mental responsibility as the McNaghten "knowledge of right and wrong"
and the "irresistible impulse" tests may not be poor as the "wild
beast" or "child of fourteen" or "partial insanity" tests; but all reveal
too simplified a notion of human motivation. "The courts when they
have called upon an expert have not always required qualified experts.
Today there is nothing to prevent practically every licensed physician
in America from testifying as an expert on any condition, mental and
bodily" (185). But this condition is being remedied in some states, as
New York, Massachusetts, and Michigan, where legal safeguards are
set up to assure of the examiner's competence as well as his impartial
attitude as amicus curiae. (X) There are some very general lines along
which treatment can be planned for some different types of offenders,
as the homosexuals, the prostitutes, and the alcoholics. The last-mentioned need help in social and sexual adaptation and a decrease of
insecurity. "There is no doubt that with the advance of knowledge in
psychiatry and penology, the soil is being prepared for a total change
of the treatment of the offender" (202). "Criminal law, then, will have
to be realistic and rational. To our mind this means that the law should
take into consideration not only the offenses but also the personality of
the offenders as well. An antisocial act can riever be separated from its
doer" (211).
Gathering these threads together the reader will be able to weave a
picture of the point of approach of Dr. Abrahamsen to the problem
suggested by the book's title. It is a viewpoint that seems to recognize
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the more advanced notions in psychiatry and psychology and in law.
And the author seems to have made some effort to incorporate them into
his treatment of the subject, but not to an impressive degree. Several
concepts are mentioned, which another writer might have turned into
key principles from which significant consequences could be deduced
and amplified; but not so here. The principle of multiple motivation
is one of the exceptions (29, 47, 156, and elsewhere). On the other
side of the account may be mentioned the Freudian "id," "ego,"
"supego" plan of mental-moral development (136), the Freudian pleasure and reality principles (31), and-in name, at least-the field-theory
manner of psychological description (53) ; none of which is made really
effective in the account.
One frequently recurring explanatory principle is contained in the
concept of the "neurotic character" as one who "must involve himself
in behavior disorders in order to be punished" on account of his "strong
guilt feeling" (108) which arises from repressed sexual or other antisocial wishes. Now, Dostoyevsky's well-known case in his CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT is an example clear-cut enough; but many clinical cases
to which Dr. Abrahamsen applies this one idea will hardly strike the
average reader as demanding just that interpretation and no other. In
any event, it will have to be admitted that such an explanation will
commonly involve the interpreter's supplying the unconscious part of
the conception, his imputation of a motive that certainly is not evident
on the face of the case. For an example: "A skillful perpetrator may
be caught through a trivial piece of evidence because he involuntarily
left this trace at the scene of the crime so that he might be apprehended" (33).
And this author is not free from occasional gratuitous assumptions,
as in the following analysis (3):
A thirty-year-old Negro murdered his wife after a party .... On the
surface this murder would appear to have been instigated by jealousy
and committed under the influence of alcohol. The life story, however,
When his mother lay on her deathrevealed the following facts ....
bed, she extracted from him a promise to marry a woman of her choice.
• ..Fearing that his mother's evil spirit would follow him if he did
not keep his promise, he married the woman ... , but he eventually
tired of his wife and so killed her. [Explanation:] Among certain
tribes in South Africa a superstition exists that man has to marry
a woman of his mother's choice. The case seems to show that a similar superstition formed an unlucky constellation of circumstances where
external imaginative forces injected fear and anxiety into the individual.
The book is somewhat loosely and casually organized, except for
some classifications and listings-as of methods of clinical examining
(80 ff.), and of types of offenders (94.ff.).
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However, the general impression given by the book as a whole is
sound. And it has particular merits. It has the merit of numerous
references to opposite case studies from the author's experiences. It
is quite easily read. There are some arresting phrases. "Nature does
not want to be classified; it struggles against such an imposition" (92).
"The number of 'dogfights' in the courts has thus been reduced" by
state-appointed mental examiners (189). "A 'blitz' diagnosis has no justification even if the psychiatrist is forced to hurry" (68). In general,
then, while not suitable as text-book or as manual of practice, this is a
book worth the reading by the lawyer who is not posted on the problems of the alienist.
JOHN F. DASHIELL.
University of North Carolina,
Department of Psychology.

Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace. By Thomas A. Bailey.
York: Macmillan and Co. 1944. Pp. 381. $3.00.

New

In this book Professor Bailey has added an interesting supplement
to his popular text-book, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE. Here we find the same provocative presentation of material
that holds the interest of the average reader as well as that of the student. Throughout the volume Professor Bailey's thesis is clear: "American public opinion should be educated in advance to its responsibilities
in world affairs, and more particularly to its responsibilities in executing
the peace treaty." His story is vital reading not only for college undergraduates but for all who are to share on the home front in the present
peace-making. The value of the book is apparent in the detailed suggestions for peace-making given in the last chapter, entitled, "Blessed
are the Peacemakers." The public will be the more ready to assume
its share of the responsibility for the peace to the extent that it becomes
informed and familiar with the aims and problems of peace-making.
With the skill of a trained historian the author uses his sources well
in presenting the many alternative courses before Wilson in particular
cases or in every case that came up. Wilson was forced to act, he acted
under pressure, and he acted without the hindsight of one possessing
the materials that are now available. It is a great tribute to Wilson to
have the author entitle his book, WOODROW WILSON AND THE LOST
PEACE. Many men and nations were involved in the peace-making, yet
there is a clear theme throughout the book that places the burden of the
peace upon Woodrow Wilson.
The proper approach to the problem of the Peace, or the Lost Peace
of Versailles, is not that we defend each victory or defeat for Wilson

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

in the process of the peace-making, but that we get an insight into the
purpose and point of view of the man as he battled with the particular
interest of each group, seeking its own advantage. The combined weight
of these forces swung the balance against him. The mass of defeats or
compromises makes more clear the major position of Wilson. The
central issue of the peace still remains a challenge to the ingenuity of
man, and Wilson, although he lost, stands out more clearly than ever
as a beacon light on the road to peace.
The peace is not lost; it was confronted with so many and so varied
demands of the old order of national security or national defense that
the total of the compromises for security gave a picture of victory for
nationalist interests to which Wilson gave assent. Wilson staked his
position on an objective concept of an international organization which
should be created to treat all problems on their merits. Each issue was
considered on the basis of justice and responsibility for all parties involved. If he failed, he failed because the people could not or would
not take responsibility. Clemenceau could see the interest of France
alone; the Japanese discussed Oriental problems only; Lloyd George
was swayed by the wishes of an English electorate whose support was
necessary to keep him in power. Wilson ignored, forgot, or blindly
defied similar forces in the United States. He was rejected by the
Senate and the people of the United States, but he became the champion
of all people who hope for a new order of world cooperation. His basic
position was the greatest good of all concerned. His information was
not infallible nor was that of his co-workers. The author shows this
strikingly in the following statement: "Lloyd George made the incredible confession at the Peace Conference that he had never heard of the
notorious Twenty-one demands presented by Japan to China in 1915."
Wilson trusted the judgment of his staff, he had a keen sense of what
was just, but when he could not win his point, he had to settle for what
he could get. If he yielded, it was not to a final defeat. He won his
first point, the League as a part of the Peace. It was the machinery
for creatively improving the world situation as man and society became
able to grasp the principles involved through the process of living
together.
Again, with his strong convictions, he never lost faith in the American people, that, in the final hour, they would support the League.
This faith was his American heritage, gained through living with the
American people, and through a life-long study of American history.
As a war leader he had felt the thrill of popular response as he led them
to victory. This faith was the background of the hope that the American people would share their achievements with a world of free people.
This faith in' the American people is still held by countless masses
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throughout the world. Wilson was loyal to his ideals, even though he
compromised to get the new order started. The perfect peace then, as
now, was not in his knowledge nor in the knowledge of his co-workers
at the Conference table. Bailey states: "The peace was lost because
Wilson made the tragic mistake of thinking that mankind could attain
a kind of international millennium at a single bound." Wilson did not
make the final settlement his goal. He did make the good of all men
and the peaceful unity of nations his principle as he stated in his fourteen points. In the League of Nations, in the mandate system, in the
minorities commission, and in the World Court he hoped to see men
work together for the promotion of the *general welfare. Thus peace
would be made as new groups and new problems came into the scope
of the men and machinery at work to promote peace. Man's concept
of order is relative; the final or absolute order is not. This is the problem of the peace-makers today and always will be the problem. How
can we get man to operate on his present experience with other men
and yet aim for the ultimate goal of a social and political order that
will include all mankind?
Professor Bailey has ably brought forth the points criticizing Wilson
for sacrificing his fourteen points in order to save the League. "Wilson was never willing to confess-and probably never believed-that he
had betrayed his points." At the Paris Peace Conference a new world
order was presented. The issue was the choice between the old nationalism, militarism, and imperialism on one side, and the League of Nations with a world order on the other. A compromise was made; the
new was begun yet there was lacking the objective point of view and
the courage to break away from the old security. Did we lose the peace?
Has the past twenty-five years of experience become a part of the peace?
Now we see man again asserting his great gift, that of ordering an
ever-growing world and environment as he experiences it. The principles of the fourteen points live on in the Atlantic Charter. The hopes
and ideals of Wilson are still before us. Woodrow Wilson and the Lost
Peace becomes a chapter in the ever-present process of peace-making.
DAVID E. FAUST.
Catawba College,
Salisbury, North Carolina.
The Wilson Era: Years of Peace-1910-1917. By Josephus Daniels.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1944. Pp. 615.
$4.00.
"Your N. C. Secretary has me guessing," wrote a naval officer to a
North Carolinian in 1914, "for he d6es such drastic things, sometimes
good and sometimes rotten, that it keeps my hair on end." While he
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soon had many friends in uniform, Wilson's secretary of the Navy was
picturesque enough and independent enough to be a perennial subject
with newspaper cartoonists and chronic critics, who exploited his abolition of the wine mess and his tilts with the sacred cows of the service
to the limits of their value, humorous and political. Whether he was so
often proven right or because as a newspaperman he took a professional
interest, Mr. Daniels in this third volume of his autobiography has
obviously enjoyed recalling the jibes as well as his exonerations. His
persistent good humor appears also in his recollections of persons. He
speaks warmly of noble friends and their gracious wives. It is easier
for him to condemn the interests and the Republicans in general than
individuals. He came to like and respect W. E. Chandler, and he found
Henry Cabot Lodge "frank and sincere" in an interview" and fully cooperative in naval matters. He is much kinder to Walter Hines Page
than Page was to Daniels, and he gives Page credit for frankness
(in contrast with Lansing and House) with respect to foreign policy,
on which they disagreed. Mr. Daniels can forgive many sins, even
addiction to Republicanism, profanity, and liquor, but not deceit. The
worst that he says of his bitterest critic, William S. Sims, is that "he
never admitted a doubt of the wisdom of his conclusions and paid very
little attention to the views of others, unless they happened to be
2
British."
Mr. Daniels expresses strong prejudices and attachments, particularly in the spirit of a Bryan Democrat of 1896 and 1900. A good
Jacksonian as well, he is inclined to believe in rotation in office and in
the virtues of upright men more than in the wisdom of experts: thus
he appointed a layman as judge advocate general (and removed him
when he learned some law and became tiresome), a professor of English
to teach naval history and strategy in the Naval Academy. He dislikes
the annexation of the Virgin Islands, whose inhabitants, like the Filipinos (and the residents of Louisiana) were not consulted, and he cannot resist stating (inaccurately) that the "first reference to obtaining the
Virgin Islands by Uncle Sam is found in a declaration of the Republican
platform in 1896."' He is shocked at "Lansing's imperialistic threat"
to Denmark-a statement that the United States would be justified in
occupying the islands to prevent their seizure by another European
power.4 Lansing's sins were that he was "a beneficiary of Republican
favors,' 5 "held to the old diplomacy that encourages exploitation of
small countries by American industrial captains," and, perhaps most
important, concealed from Wilson his real sympathy for the British
cause. Mr. Daniels himself is slightly suspicious of the British, who,
Pp. 532-3.
'Pp. 175-6.

P. 436.

2 P. 270.

'Ibid.

'P. 438.
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he says, got the better of the United States in the Hay-Pauncefote
treaty,7 and "hypnotized" Colonel House (of whom Daniels's estimate
is low).8 George Harvey "went lown to lasting ignominy when he
declared that the Americans did not fight .

.

. to make the world safe

The picture of Wilson
for democracy, but to save their own skins."
is drawn with reverence and devotion. North Carolinians will be interested in the references to Wilson's contacts with the state, and will
note how much Mr. Daniels's conception of a university resembles Wilson's.10 They may be interested also in the influence attributed to Tom
Pence, Washington correspondent of the News and Observer, who
worked for Wilson's nomination.
One hopes that Mr. Daniels's next volume will contain more material on the controversies over naval preparedness and efficiency. He
slides over many things here, while giving evidence of his convictions.
"The Republicans had let the Merchant Marine languish along with the
Navy."'" Daniels's three offenses in the campaign of 1916 related to
i2
the government armor-plate plant, the wine mess, and the oil reserves,
not to preparedness. He "worked day and night to make ready,"'u but
he does not discuss his own switch from his position of 1914 ("we
should go on just as if there were no war"), or the changes he made
in the admirals' estimates for materiel and personnel. He dismisses
Admiral Sims' proposals for departmental reorganization as "British"
and Admiral Fiske's as "German" and a "scheme of getting power into
his own hands."' 4 Readers may want to check another side in books
such as E. E. Morison's ADMIRAL SIMS AND THE MODERN AMERICAN
NAvY. There is a vivid account of the Japanese war scare of 1913.
Wilson said that the Japanese ambassador "gave evidence that his country looked for war,"' 5 but when Secretary Garrison urged steps to protect the Philippines, Daniels observed that "his remark was proof of
our country's unwisdom in embarking upon a colonial and imperialistic
policy when we took the Philippines by force.

. .""I

In discussing

preparedness, he offers a new theory of why Hughes lost California in
1916: Daniels's influence on behalf of the Mare Island and San Diego
bases gave those districts to the Democrats.' 7 Interestingly, in view of
the argument between Governor Dewey and President Roosevelt in
1940 on the subject of a two-ocean navy ("it is dumb to talk of naval
defense in those terms"), Mr. Daniels uses the term several times, and
8
with pride.'
213.
9 P. 30.
11 P. 416.
13 P. 590.
"P. 161.
Pp. 471-72, 309-310.
'
7 P.

8
P. 571.
10
P. 5.
22 P. 462.

"1P. 242.
"P. 165.
18 Pp. vii, 308, 309.
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The book is frankly and appropriately casual in arrangement. The
many cartoons and photographs are delightful additions to the pen pictures. Reminiscence mingles with reference to standard historical works
and with excerpts from.Mr. Daniels's diary, which one hopes may (like
the Welles and Bates diaries of Lincoln's time) some day see the light
in full form, or at least survive fire, which destroyed some of Mr. Daniels's early files in Raleigh, to be a rich quarry for other historians of
the Wilson period. And one hopes that Mr. Daniels may give us soon
his recollections of the years 1917-1921, while they may help us with
present wartime and post-war problems. Unfortunately a man who has
enough energy to serve as ambassador and edit a newspaper in his
eighties, as well as to write another lively and valuable book, will always be a few steps ahead of his own autobiography.
EARL S. POMEROY,

The University of North Carolina.

